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Abstract
The regulatory framework in Europe does not prevent banks from tak-
ing large or controlling equity stakes in non-financial firms, potentially con-
tributing to higher levels of bank risk and financial instability. Using a panel
of European commercial banks for the period 2004-2008, we find that higher
levels of equity positions in industrial firms and higher proportions of indus-
trial firms where the bank is the majority shareholder lead to higher bank
activity and insolvency risk. At low levels of shareholder protection, these
risk measures are reduced when equity investments are held for longer, an
effect attenuated at higher levels of shareholder protection.
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1 Introduction
Bank ownership in industrial, i.e. non-financial, firms has for many years been
a common practice in a wide range of countries. In Europe, such activities are
governed by the Second Banking Directive, which came into force on January 1,
1993; it stipulates that banks’ equity investments in a single non-financial firm
may not exceed 15% of the bank’s capital, and not be larger than 60% of its cap-
ital for all such equity investments in non-financial firms taken together. These
regulatory restrictions, however, do not necessarily prevent banks that are well
capitalized from holding large, or even controlling, stakes in non-financial firms’
capital,1 thereby potentially contributing to higher levels of bank risk and thus fi-
nancial instability. In the United States, on the other hand, the question of whether
banks should be allowed to hold equity positions in non-financial firms is still ac-
tively discussed, as U.S. banks have historically been prohibited from investing in
the stock of firms for their own account. Santos and Rumble (2006) stress that this
has not prevented them from making these investments through their trust busi-
ness and from voting the stock they hold in trust; however, as this puts only their
clients’ investments at risk, this has generally no consequences for the banks’ risk
position.
There is a substantial, mostly empirical, literature studying the consequences
of bank equity investments for firms, which examines the impact of such equity
investments on firms’ agency costs of debt, their funding, their performance, and
their ability to recover from financial distress.2 Some recent studies also investi-
gate the loan pricing effect of banks’ voting stakes in borrowing firms (Ferreira
and Matos 2012, Santos and Wilson 2010). However, from a public policy point
of view, the expected impact of bank equity investments on bank risk is also of
obvious interest, given its overall importance for financial stability.
Whether or not bank equity investments tend to raise or lower bank risk has
1This has been observed more generally by La Porta et al. (1999) in their study of the ownership
structure of firms.
2See Santos (1998) and Barucci and Mattesini (2008) for detailed surveys of this literature.
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been studied mostly from a theoretical perspective, and seems to be far from a
clear cut issue in the literature. From a portfolio theoretic perspective, substitut-
ing debt for (riskier) equity should raise bank profits at the cost of making them
riskier. In Park (2000), having larger equity investments might lead the bank to
encourage firms to take on riskier projects, which might increase the riskiness of
the bank’s combined debt and equity position in the firm. However, as argued by
Pozdena (1991) and Kim (1992), a debt-equity contract may encourage firms to
implement less risky strategies than a pure debt contract, as it lowers the outstand-
ing value of debt to be repaid. John et al. (1994) and Santos (1999) then show that
for banks making equity investments in addition to traditional lending, these two
opposing effects may actually result in banks’ portfolio risk being overall lowered,
or as shown by Lepetit (2003), even lead to a U-shaped relationship, i.e. one where
risk decreases for low levels of equity investment but increases thereafter. Boyd
et al. (1998) further argue that when state verification is costly, allowing banks to
take equity positions in addition to lending to firms may reduce their incentives to
control moral hazard; as they could share in the potential benefits of “misallocat-
ing” investment capital, banks might spend fewer resources on monitoring firms’
projects, leading to increased bank risk.
Intriguingly, this theoretical literature is complemented by very little corre-
sponding empirical work, apart from Lepetit (2003) who studies the relationship
between banks’ risk and their total equity investment using a panel of European,
US and Japanese universal and investment banks for the period 1991-1998; she
finds a U-shaped relationship, i.e. for low levels of overall exposure to equity
investment activities risk decreases, but it increases thereafter.
Our paper aims to further the empirical investigation of these issues. To this
end, we go beyond analyzing the relationship between banks’ overall exposure to
equity investment activities and bank risk by examining in much more detail the
strength of banks’ equity involvement in individual industrial firms, their level of
control in these firms, the length of time these equity investments are held for,
and the consequences for bank risk implied by these. We also investigate whether
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the degree of shareholder protection, i.e. the ability of shareholders to exercise
control over self-interested managers, matters in this context. For this purpose,
we constructed a novel database with detailed information on banks’ individual
equity investments on a per-firm level, that allows a more refined empirical exam-
ination of the predictions generated by the existing theoretical literature. Given
the established regulatory framework in Europe that allows banks to take possibly
large, or even controlling, equity positions in non-financial firms, we focus our
investigation on a panel of European commercial banks for the period 2004-2008.
We find that having higher levels of equity positions in industrial firms leads
to both higher activity and insolvency risk for commercial banks. Additionally,
higher proportions of industrial firms in which a commercial bank is the majority
shareholder also lead to increased activity and insolvency risk. Both these results
are economically significant, unaffected by the degree of shareholder protection,
and consistent with the theoretical work of Boyd et al. (1998) and Park (2000),
which argued that banks with larger equity investments might have strong incen-
tives to drive firms to take on riskier projects. For low levels of shareholder protec-
tion, we find that banks with higher proportions of longer-term equity investments
in industrial firms have lower activity and insolvency risk. At higher levels of
shareholder protection, however, the magnitude of risk reduction associated with
longer holding times of such equity investments decreases; this is consistent with
a scenario where shareholders that are better able to exert influence over managers
become less passive over time, pushing managers to adopt higher risk strategies.
Taking into account different dimensions of bank’s equity involvement in in-
dustrial firms, we thus find that the greater banks’ potential to influence the behav-
ior of firms they hold equity investments in, the more such equity investments lead
to increased bank risk. Overall, our results demonstrate that the existing regula-
tory framework in Europe seems to do little to prevent banks from taking large or
even controlling equity stakes in non-financial firms, and might thereby contribute
to higher levels of bank risk and thus financial instability.
Section 2 describes our research questions, presents our data and variables, and
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derives some descriptive statistics; Section 3 contains our empirical specification
and presents our results; Section 4 discusses robustness and further issues; and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Bank equity involvement: issues and measurement
2.1 Research questions
As discussed in the introduction, the current state of the theoretical literature is
unable to provide clear cut predictions as to how bank equity involvement in in-
dustrial firms impacts on bank risk. Banks engaging in equity investments may
face increased risk through the mechanisms outlined by Boyd et al. (1998) and
Park (2000); John et al. (1994) and Santos (1999), on the other hand, describe
alternative scenarios in which such bank equity involvement might actually lead
to lower bank risk.
These mixed theoretical predictions on the relationship between bank equity
involvement and their level of risk give rise to a number of interesting empirical
research questions, particularly as the degree of equity involvement of banks in
industrial firms can manifest itself along several dimensions. We firstly examine
Question 1 What impact does a bank’s level of equity investment in industrial
firms have on bank risk?
This question is suggested directly by the theoretical literature; it could be
taken further by examining whether the fact that a bank has controlling levels of
equity investments in industrial firms has a particular impact on bank risk. Banks
might have the potential to directly impose their risk preferences on firms in this
case, which, as Park (2000) argues, could lead to those firms adopting riskier
projects, increasing the riskiness of the bank’s investment in the firm. This implies
Question 2 What impact does the fact that a bank has controlling equity stakes
in industrial firms have on bank risk?
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An additional dimension of banks’ equity involvement in industrial firms that
might influence bank risk is the time such equity investments are held for. The
risk implications of long-term investments could be very different from those
stemming from more "hit-and-run" investment strategies, as longer-term investors
might be less focussed on short-term earnings growth, with its accompanying
higher risk (Stein 1988, Jacobs 1991, Porter 1992). An alternative channel might
be that longer-term investors might become less actively involved in the firm,
thereby potentially allowing risk-averse managers, whose human capital is tied to
the firm, to favor less risky strategies (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This suggests
Question 3 What impact does the time a bank holds equity investments in indus-
trial firms for have on bank risk?
A further interesting refinement would be to look at whether different degrees
of shareholder protection could influence the relationship between the three di-
mensions of bank equity involvement and bank risk examined so far. The seminal
work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) stresses the importance of the degree of
investor protection provided by different countries’ legal environments, as share-
holders in countries with higher levels of shareholder protection will be better able
to exercise control over self-interested managers. This results in
Question 4 Does the degree of shareholder protection have an impact on the re-
lationship between bank risk and bank equity involvement in industrial firms?
To examine these questions, we constructed a novel database using firm-level
data on European commercial banks’ equity investments in industrial firms and
measures reflecting the different dimensions of bank equity involvement under
consideration, as described in the following sections.
2.2 Sample definition
Our study focusses on European commercial banks, for which we extracted both
(unconsolidated) bank financial statement and firm-level equity investment data
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from BvD BankScope, which provides detailed information on the latter only
starting 2004. Our data set therefore covers the period 2004-2008, and includes
the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. We construct our data set from individual
cross-sections using annual releases of BankScope to capture the time-varying
dimension of banks’ equity investment. BankScope provides unconsolidated fi-
nancial statement data for 1909 European commercial banks for at least some of
the period considered; when requiring a minimum four observations3 for our bank
balance sheet variables, this number drops to 478. After some data cleaning, we
are left with a final sample of 444 commercial banks; Table 1 gives a breakdown of
these by country. Table 2 presents some general descriptive statistics for both our
data set and the corresponding full sample of banks available under BankScope.
For the majority of countries in our sample, the data coverage as measured in per-
cent of total assets lies above 60%, with bank activity characteristics in our sample
very close to those in the wider BankScope one.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2]
2.3 Equity investment measures
BankScope provides detailed information for each firm in which a bank has an
equity stake, in particular the percentage of the firm’s equity held by the bank.
In line with the existing theoretical literature, we focus our study on equity in-
vestments of banks in industrial firms. To examine our Questions 1–4, we then
construct three particular measures to characterize the relevant degrees of bank
equity involvement.
Firstly, to address Question 1, we calculate the percentage of individual indus-
trial firms’ total equity held by a bank, on a per-firm basis. We then calculate the
3This enables us to properly calculate the moments required for our risk measures, but sub-
stantially reduces the number of usable observations.
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average of these across all the industrial firms a bank invests in (FIRM_EQ). We
also capture the level of control a bank exerts in industrial firms in which it has
an equity stake, in line with Question 2, by computing the proportion of firms in
which the bank is the majority shareholder, i.e. holds more than 50% of the firm’s
equity (PROP_CONTR). We are further able to compute for how long a bank holds
an equity position in a given firm, which allows us to address Question 3. For this,
we compute the proportion of firms in which a bank consecutively holds equity
investments for 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 years, respectively (PROP_HT1. . . PROP_HT5).
These measures could have a potential bias problem, however: a measured hold-
ing time of, say, one year for an equity investment in the year 2004, the beginning
of our sample period, could actually relate to a longer-run investment that just ends
in that year. To correct for this potential mismeasurement, we drop observations
with a holding time of one or two years where an equity investment occurred in the
year 2004 and then calculate the proportion of firms a bank holds equity positions
in for either 3, 4 or 5 years (PROP_LHT); this allows us to differentiate between
short and longer-term equity investment behavior. Finally, to examine Question
4, we interact our equity investment measures FIRM_EQ, PROP_CONTR and
PROP_LHT with an index that captures the different degrees of shareholder pro-
tection in place across Europe (see Section 3.1).
Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics of these measures over the period
2004-2008. The commercial banks in our sample have on average an equity posi-
tion in 47 industrial firms (with a maximum of 3497), hold on average more than
30% of the firms’ equity, and are the majority shareholder in more than 27% of the
firms in which they hold an equity position. The largest proportion of equity hold-
ings has a holding time of only one year, with a decrease in the proportions held
for longer periods. Interestingly, though, commercial banks hold more of firms’
equity the longer the time of their involvement. While total equity investments
(both financial and non-financial) amount to around 2% of total assets (EXPOS1)
for the banks in our sample, banks’ total equity investments represent on average
more than 27% of their equity (EXPOS2).
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[Insert Table 3]
2.4 Bank risk measures
We consider several commonly used measures of bank risk computed from ac-
counting data.4 To reflect bank activity risk, we use the standard deviation of re-
turn on equity (SD_ROE) and return on assets (SD_ROA), respectively. To proxy
bank insolvency risk, we use the logarithm of two Z-score measures,5 defined as
LOG_Z D ln ..100C ROE/ =SD_ROE/ and, more commonly, LOG_ZP D
ln ..ROAC EQ_TA/ =SD_ROA/, where ROE and ROA are average return on eq-
uity and return on assets, and EQ_TA is the average equity to total assets ratio (all
in percentages).
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for our different bank risk measures. To
have an initial look at whether a bank’s taking of equity positions in industrial
firms has an impact on its risk, we first split the sample between banks that en-
gage in such equity investments and those that do not, and perform mean tests
on our summary statistics. We observe that commercial banks without equity in-
vestments in industrial firms have a lower standard deviation of return on equity
SD_ROE, accompanied by lower insolvency risk, i.e. higher levels of both our
Z-score measures LOG_Z and LOG_ZP. We then further split the subsample of
banks that have equity investments in industrial firms into those with above and
below average levels of such equity investment FIRM_EQ. Again, commercial
banks with relatively high levels of equity investments in industrial firms display
a higher standard deviation of return on equity SD_ROE, which is further accom-
panied by a higher implied probability of insolvency.
[Insert Table 4]
4Only 58 of the 444 commercial banks in our sample are listed on the stock market; relying on
market based risk measures would thus severely reduce the sample.
5Both Z-score measures are based on the Bienaymé-Chebyshev inequality, as in Hannan and
Hanweck (1988) and Boyd et al. (1993). As Z-scores are highly skewed, we use their natural
logarithms as in Laeven and Levine (2009) and Houston et al. (2010).
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Model specification
The univariate analysis of the previous section already indicated that banks with
relatively high levels of equity investments in industrial firms display both higher
activity and insolvency risk. We now extend our analysis to a multivariate frame-
work to properly examine the four questions regarding the relationship between
bank equity involvement in industrial firms and bank risk introduced in Section
2.1.
In Questions 1–3, we examine if the degree of bank equity involvement in
industrial firms, through their level of equity investment, the control they exercise
and/or the time they hold these equity positions for, has an impact on bank risk.
As the first dimension is highly correlated with the remaining two (see Table A1
in the Appendix), we examine these separately in the following two specifications
DEP_VARi D 0 C 1FIRM_EQi C 2EXPOS1i C 3NL_TAi
C 4NONINT i C 5EQ_TAi C 6LOG_TAi C 7GR_TAi
C 8SUP_REGi C 9ACT_REST i C 10Xi C i (1)
DEP_VARi D 0 C 1PROP_CONTRi C 2PROP_LHT i C 3EXPOS1i
C 4NL_TAi C 5NONINT i C 6EQ_TAi C 7LOG_TAi
C 8GR_TAi C 9SUP_REGi C 10ACT_REST i C 11Xi C i (2)
Our dependent variables DEP_VAR are the activity risk measures SD_ROA and
SD_ROE and the insolvency risk measures LOG_Z and LOG_ZP, as defined in
Section 2.4. The degree of equity involvement of banks is represented in Equation
(1) by the mean of each bank’s equity investments as a percentage of individual
industrial firms’ total equity, FIRM_EQ. In Equation (2), we consider the two
other dimensions of banks’ equity involvement: PROP_CONTR is the proportion
of firms a bank holds equity investments in where it is the majority shareholder,
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and PROP_LHT is the proportion of firms a bank holds equity positions in for
either 3, 4 or 5 years.
In both specifications, we control for the degree of exposure of banks to equity
investment activities by including the ratio of total equity investments to total
assets EXPOS1.6 We also introduce a set of commonly used control variables (as
in Lepetit et al. 2008), accounting for business differences with the average net
loans to total assets ratio NL_TA and the average ratio of net non-interest income
to total operating income NONINT, for leverage with the average equity to total
assets ratio EQ_TA, for size with the logarithm of average total assets LOG_TA,
and for acquisition effects with the average growth rate of total assets GR_TA.
Due to their strong correlation, we orthogonalize NL_TA with respect to NONINT
(see Table A1). We add the average profitability measures X 2 fROA;ROEg to the
activity risk equations. We also introduce two country-level indices for strength
of supervisory regime (SUP_REG) and bank activity restrictions (ACT_REST),7
drawn from the World Bank’s 2008 Bank Regulation and Supervision database,
in line with Laeven and Levine (2009) and Shehzad et al. (2010).
Finally, in Question 4, we investigate whether differences in regulations re-
garding shareholder protection existing across Europe have an impact on the rela-
tionship between bank risk and bank equity involvement in industrial firms, as bet-
ter protected shareholders will be more able to exercise control over self-interested
managers. For this we use the revised anti-director rights index in Djankov et al.
(2008), which ranges in principle from 0 to 6 and considers shareholders’ voting
powers, their ease of participation in corporate voting, and their legal protection
6BvD BankScope only provides the value of total equity investments in all types of firms
together (i.e. financial and non-financial), so we are unable to characterize banks’ exposure to
equity investment in industrial firms on their own. In principle, we could reconstruct this if we had
total equity data for the firms banks invest in; however, BankScope does not provide this. Attempts
to find this information elsewhere failed, as we do not have a BvD identifier for on average 15600
firms per year; this makes identification of these through other means impracticable: as they are
not covered by any of the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) databases, they are presumably of rather small
size.
7The latter variable in particular allows for the different national degrees of regulations gov-
erning bank equity investments in non-financial firms.
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against expropriation by managers. For our European sample we observe a large
degree of heterogeneity in the level of shareholder protection, with the index hav-
ing a mean of 3.5 and ranging from 2 to 5 (see Table A2 in the Appendix). In
order to examine Question 4, we then augment Equations (1–2) with interaction
terms between the shareholder protection index (SH_PROCT), scaled to have a
minimum of zero for ease of interpretation, and our measures of bank equity in-
volvement (i.e. FIRM_EQ, PROP_CONTR and PROP_LHT), as follows
DEP_VARi D 0C1FIRM_EQiC2FIRM_EQi SH_PROCT iC3EXPOS1i
C 4NL_TAi C 5NONINT i C 6EQ_TAi C 7LOG_TAi
C8GR_TAiC9SUP_REGiC10ACT_REST iC11SH_PROCT iC12XiCi
(3)
DEP_VARi D 0 C 1PROP_CONTRi C 2PROP_CONTRi  SH_PROCT i
C 3PROP_LHT i C 4PROP_LHT i  SH_PROCT i C 5EXPOS1i
C 6NL_TAi C 7NONINT i C 8EQ_TAi C 9LOG_TAi
C10GR_TAiC11SUP_REGiC12ACT_REST iC13SH_PROCT iC14XiCi
(4)
3.2 Results and discussion
Our regression analysis is restricted to be cross-sectional due to the time-invariant
nature of our holding time measures. We need to allow for the possibility that
the relationship between bank equity involvement and bank risk under investiga-
tion might in fact be facing an endogeneity problem: it is conceivable that banks
which generally pursue higher risk strategies might actually be predisposed to
engage in such equity investment activities in industrial firms. To address this
problem in an instrumental variables framework, we ultimately drew on set of in-
struments related to general business conditions, drawn from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators, as it proved impossible to find valid bank level
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instruments.8
Rather than follow a simple instrumental variables approach, we use the two-
step efficient generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, which gives es-
timates that are efficient for, and standard errors that are robust to, arbitrary het-
eroskedasticity. From our larger set of instrument candidates, we determine an
appropriate subset of instruments for each of our Equations (1–4) and each of
the four risk measures. We check that these instruments are relevant by test-
ing for underidentification using the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic,9 which is
heteroskedasticity-robust. As we have a sufficient number of instruments, we can
test their validity, in the sense that they are appropriately uncorrelated with the
error term, by performing Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions;10 Hansen’s
J-statistic is similarly heteroskedasticity-robust. We then lastly test whether our
equity involvement measures are in fact endogenous using the corresponding C
(or GMM distance) test.11 When we cannot reject the null of exogeneity of re-
gressors, we estimate our equations using simple OLS instead, correcting for het-
eroskedasticity following White’s methodology.
The estimation results regarding Question 1 using Equation (1) are then pre-
sented in Table 5, those for Questions 2 and 3 using Equation (2) in Table 6, and
the ones for Question 4 using Equations (3–4) in Tables 7 and 8. We note that
the validity of the instruments used in our IV regressions, as tested with Hansen’s
J-statistic, is generally not put in doubt, despite the fact that these are not strictly
bank specific.
8Our set of instrument candidates consists of the following: business entry rate (new registra-
tions as % of total), business extent of disclosure index, cost of business start-up procedures (% of
GNI per capita), ease of doing business index, employment in industry (% of total employment),
highest marginal corporate tax rate, highest marginal individual tax rate, market capitalization of
listed companies (% of GDP), patent applications (residents), research and development expendi-
ture (% of GDP), researchers in R&D (per million people), rigidity of employment index, start-up
procedures to register a business (number), strength of legal rights index, time required to enforce
a contract (days), time required to start a business (days), total tax rate (% of profit).
9See Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
10See Hayashi (2000, pp. 217-218).
11See Hayashi (2000, pp. 218-220).
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Consistent with our univariate analysis of Section 2, we find in response to
our Question 1 that higher equity involvement of commercial banks in industrial
firms (FIRM_EQ) leads to higher levels of activity risk (Table 5). Additionally,
commercial banks with higher levels of equity involvement present higher levels
of insolvency risk. These results are consistent with the simple portfolio theoretic
argument that increased equity holdings lead to increased risk, the channel out-
lined by Park (2000) that banks with larger equity investments might have more
incentives to allow firms to pursue riskier projects, and the moral hazard related
mechanisms described by Boyd et al. (1998) that might similarly result in in-
creased bank risk. Furthermore, both of these results are economically significant:
on average, a 1% increase in a bank’s mean level of equity investments (as a per-
centage of individual industrial firms’ total equity) leads to an almost 3% increase
in the bank’s probability of insolvency,12 and a roughly half percent increase in
its activity risk (SD_ROA, SD_ROE).
Addressing Questions 2 and 3, using our alternative specification of Equa-
tion (2), we find that the two complementary dimensions of bank equity involve-
ment in industrial firms matter. Commercial banks that have a higher proportion
of investment in firms where they are the majority shareholder (as expressed by
PROP_CONTR) have both higher activity and insolvency risk (Table 6). This is
in support of the arguments of Park (2000) that banks have the incentive, and
as majority shareholder the means, to drive firms to take on riskier projects. In
terms of economic significance, we find that a 1% increase in the proportion of
industrial firms where a bank is the majority shareholder leads on average to a
roughly 2% increase in the bank’s probability of insolvency, but only a one fifth
percent increase in its activity risk. Our results further show that commercial
banks with higher proportions of longer-term equity investments (as measured by
PROP_LHT) have lower activity risk, whereas the impact on insolvency risk is
only weakly significant. This would be consistent with banks pursuing "hit-and-
12Note that the Bienaymé-Chebyshev inequality implies an upper bound of the probability of
insolvency p as p  exp .M/ 2 where M 2 fLOG_Z;LOG_ZPg, as in Hannan and Hanweck
(1988) and Boyd et al. (1993).
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run" strategies regarding firms with riskier projects, but adopting more long term
investments in firms with less risky behavior, or the alternative mechanism where
long-term investors become less actively involved in the firm, potentially allowing
managers to favor less risky strategies. The impact of longer holding times is only
economically significant for banks’ insolvency risk: on average, a 1% increase in
a bank’s proportion of longer-term investments in industrial firms leads to a 1.5%
increase in its probability of insolvency.
We find for all our specifications that banks’ overall exposure to equity in-
vestment activities, as measured by the ratio of total equity investments (financial
and non-financial) to total assets (EXPOS1), has no significant impact on either
activity or insolvency risk. Re-running our Equations (1) and (2) without our re-
fined equity involvement measures (FIRM_EQ, PROP_CONTR and PROP_LHT)
does, however, show that banks with higher ratios of total equity investments to
total assets display higher activity and insolvency risk (see Table A3 in the Appen-
dix). Taken together, we obtain the interesting result that bank risk is affected by
banks’ different dimensions of equity involvement in industrial firms, but appears
unrelated to their overall equity investment activity and thus, by deduction, their
equity involvement in non-industrial, i.e. financial firms.
Turning to Question 4, we observe from Table 7 that the relationship between
the level of bank equity investment in industrial firms (FIRM_EQ) and bank ac-
tivity and insolvency risk, estimated with Equation (3), does not depend on the
degree of shareholder protection (SH_PROCT). In Table 8, we then examine the
relationship between our two alternative measures of bank equity involvement and
bank risk, estimated using Equation (4). Apart from for the LOG_ZP insolvency
risk measure, we find that the degree of shareholder protection does not affect
the relationship between the proportion of firms a bank is majority shareholder of
and bank risk; as majority shareholder, the bank already has the ability to control
the firm’s manager, so the level of general shareholder protection becomes less
relevant in this case.
We do, however, find that the degree of shareholder protection does have a
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significant impact on the relationship between both activity and insolvency risk
and the time a bank’s equity investments in industrial firms are held for. At low
levels of shareholder protection, holding such equity investments for longer re-
sults in lower bank activity and insolvency risk, consistent with shareholders that
are unable to exert strong direct influence on managers becoming more passive,
thus leaving those managers to pursue less risky strategies. At higher levels of
shareholder protection, longer holding times of equity investments lead to smaller
decreases in bank activity risk, to the point that the impact becomes insignificant
where shareholder protection is at its maximum; this is consistent with sharehold-
ers that are better able to exert influence over managers becoming less passive
over time, pushing managers to adopt higher risk strategies. We observe a re-
lated pattern for the insolvency risk measures: longer holding times reduce the
magnitude of the reduction of insolvency risk at median shareholder protection
levels; however, the impact of longer holdings times actually becomes reversed at
maximum levels of shareholder protection, i.e. holding its equity investments in
industrial firms for longer increases a bank’s insolvency risk in this case.
Overall we find that higher levels of equity positions in industrial firms are
associated with both higher activity and insolvency risk. Additionally, higher pro-
portions of industrial firms in which a commercial bank is the majority share-
holder also lead to higher activity and insolvency risk. Both of these relationships
are economically significant; neither of them, however, is strongly affected by the
degree of shareholder protection. Banks with higher proportions of longer-term
equity investments in industrial firms have lower activity and insolvency risk at
low levels of shareholder protection. With higher levels of shareholder protection,
the magnitude of risk reduction implied by longer holding times of such equity in-
vestments decreases; at the maximum level of shareholder protection, this results
in the marginal effect of longer holding times becoming insignificant for activity
risk, whereas it actually leads to increased levels of insolvency risk. Our results
therefore show, across different dimensions of bank’s equity involvement in in-
dustrial firms, that the more the bank has the ability to influence the behavior of
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firms or their managers, the more such equity investments lead to increased bank
risk.
[Insert Tables 5–8]
4 Robustness and further issues
We explore several variations of our previous analysis to further investigate our
results. We re-run Equations (1–2) on a sample containing only banks that actually
engage in equity investments in industrial firms (i.e. with positive FIRM_EQ). We
have 353 such banks, with a mean FIRM_EQ of 38.5%; we obtain results very
similar to the ones for the larger sample, with additionally a strongly significant
reduction in bank insolvency risk associated with longer-term equity investments
(see Tables 9–10). We further note the absence of an endogeneity problem for this
sample, indicating that whether or not a bank pursues equity investment activities
in industrial firms depends on its risk profile, whereas the different degrees of
equity involvement for those banks that engage in this kind of activity do not
depend on bank risk.
We then examine whether the relationship between the level of equity invest-
ment of banks and their level of risk is non-linear, a possibility demonstrated
theoretically by Lepetit (2003) which shows that bank risk might decrease for low
levels of equity investment in an industrial firm but then increase beyond a given
point. For this we add the demeaned square of FIRM_EQ to Equation (1), but do
not find any support for such a U-shaped relationship for our sample (Table 11).13
We further examine a possible size effect in the relationship between equity
involvement and bank risk by running Equations (1–2) separately on samples con-
taining large and small banks, respectively (with a threshold of total assets of one
billion euros; see Tables 12–15). We find for both large and small banks that
13Note that this U-shaped relationship might be difficult to detect in our sample as the equity
investment measure FIRM_EQ is averaged across all industrial firms a particular bank holds equity
investments in.
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higher levels of equity positions in industrial firms, or higher proportions of in-
dustrial firms in which the bank is the majority shareholder, are associated with
higher activity and insolvency risk. Longer term equity involvement in industrial
firms decrease both activity and insolvency risk for large banks only, with no such
effect observed for small banks.
[Insert Tables 9–15]
5 Conclusion
We examined whether the equity investments of banks in industrial firms have an
impact on bank activity and insolvency risk. This is of obvious interest from a
public policy point of view, not least because the theoretical literature’s predic-
tions of this relationship are far from clear cut. We constructed a novel database
on European commercial banks for the period 2004-2008 which is fine enough to
consider three dimensions of the characteristics of banks’ equity involvement in
individual industrial firms. We also examined whether the degree of shareholder
protection, i.e. the ability of shareholders to exercise control over self-interested
managers, matters in this context.
We found that commercial banks’ having higher levels of equity positions in
industrial firms results in both higher activity and insolvency risk. Additionally,
higher levels of control in industrial firms, i.e. higher proportions in which a com-
mercial bank is the majority shareholder, are also associated with higher activity
and insolvency risk. Both of these results are economically significant: e.g., a 1%
increase in a bank’s mean level of equity investments (as a percentage of individ-
ual industrial firms’ total equity) leads on average to an almost 3% increase in the
bank’s probability of insolvency. These results are consistent with the theoretical
work of Boyd et al. (1998) and Park (2000), which argued that banks with larger
equity investments might have strong incentives to push firms to take on riskier
projects; neither of these two relationships was found to be strongly affected by
the degree of shareholder protection.
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When levels of shareholder protection are low, we found that banks with
higher proportions of longer-term equity investments in industrial firms have lower
activity and insolvency risk. At higher levels of shareholder protection, the mag-
nitude of risk reduction associated with longer holding times of such equity in-
vestments decreases; when shareholder protection is at its maximum, the mar-
ginal effect of longer holding times becomes insignificant for activity risk as a
consequence, whereas insolvency risk, on the other hand, actually increases when
banks hold their equity investments for longer. This relationship is consistent with
a scenario where shareholders that are better able to exert influence over managers
become less passive over time, pushing managers to adopt higher risk strategies.
Considering different dimensions of bank’s equity involvement in industrial
firms, we thus observe that the greater banks’ potential to influence the behavior
of firms they hold equity investments in, the more such equity investments lead to
increased bank risk. We importantly also find that the existing regulatory frame-
work in Europe, which limits bank equity investments in terms of banks’ level
of capital, seems to do little to prevent banks from taking large or even control-
ling equity stakes in non-financial firms, thereby contributing to higher levels of
bank risk and thus financial instability. Future regulatory reforms in this area, be
it in Europe, the U.S. or elsewhere, might therefore consider limiting bank equity
investments in terms of the individual firms’ level of capital. However, the pos-
sibility of engaging in cross holdings might render such restrictions meaningless
without further regulatory measures, which might explain the predominant current
state of regulations in this area of bank activities.
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Table 1. Distribution of banks by country and type 
 
Country Our sample of commercial banks 
 Large Small Total 
Total number of 
commercial banks in 
BankScope 
% Total assetsa 
Austria 8 15 23 91 41.30 
Belgium 9 3 12 60 37.28 
Denmark 15 16 31 72 59.59 
Finland 4 1 5 11 65.45 
France 46 24 70 262 57.12 
Germany 31 52 83 277 62.81 
Greece 7 0 7 27 66.23 
Ireland 0 0 0 43 0 
Italy 56 2 58 227 63.51 
Luxembourg 29 10 39 141 61.88 
Netherlands 1 0 1 56 0.18 
Norway 1 0 1 23 18.51 
Portugal 2 2 4 35 65.05 
Spain 19 3 22 115 76.28 
Sweden 4 5 9 25 85.45 
Switzerland 12 51 63 242 66.93 
U.K. 12 4 16 202 8.64 
Total 256 188 444 1909 Median = 61.88 
Large/small banks have total assets larger/smaller than 1 billion €. 
a % Total assets represents total assets of commercial banks we consider in our sample divided by total assets of commercial banks of the full sample of banks 
provided by BvD BankScope for the year 2008. 
 
 
Table 2. General descriptive statistics, on average over the period 2004-2008 
 
 DEP_TA NL_TA EQ_TA LLP_TA NONINT ROA ROE GR_TA TA 
Full sample of commercial banks available in  BankScope (1909 banks) 
Mean 74.76 55.65 10.79 0.43 32.83 0.64 6.40 9.14 8033.26 
Minimum 0 0 0 -24.43 -279.65 -49.82 -148.10 -99.65 0.50 
Maximum 99.23 99.95 100 29.13 290.48 48.67 136.01 285.03 2246380 
Std. Dev. 19.72 23.14 11.94 0.88 25.11 2.03 10.65 21.54 57787.71 
Our sample of commercial banks (444 banks) 
Mean 73.01 52.15 9.43 0.39 42.92 0.87 9.93 12.01 25331.75 
Minimum 0.19 0.00 0.96 -7.37 -87.78 -3.01 -65.62 -31.21 20.30 
Maximum 98 99.21 84.00 29.13 110.55 8.70 71.38 101.49 1476787 
Std. Dev. 19.03 28.67 7.63 1.06 25.38 1.12 10.67 14.10 112872.8 
Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentages, except TA which is in millions of Euros): DEP_TA = deposits/total assets; NL_TA = net 
loans/total assets; EQ_TA= equity/total assets; LLP_TA = loan loss provisions/total assets; NONINT= net non interest income/net operating income; ROA = 
return on assets; ROE= return on equity; GR_TA = annual growth rate of total assets; TA= total assets (millions Euros). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of bank equity investment measures, over the period 2004-2008 
 
 N_FIRMS FIRM_EQ PROP_CONTR FIRM_EQ_CONTR EXPOS1 EXPOS2 
Mean 47.66 30.96 27.87 91.12 1.90 27.31 
Maximum 3497.4 100 100 100 29.83 386.91 
Minimum 0 0 0 50 0 0 
Std. Dev. 236.06 28.92 29.34 11.33 3.40 45.39 
 
 PROP_LHT PROP_HT1 PROP_HT2 PROP_HT3 PROP_HT4 PROP_HT5 
Mean 36.32 44.23 16.69 15.85 13.18 11.05 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 34.92 32.87 20.28 24.79 24.34 22.88 
 
 FIRM_EQ_HT1 FIRM_EQ_HT2 FIRM_EQ_HT3 FIRM_EQ_HT4 FIRM_EQ_HT5 
Mean 38.56 42.73 50.43 56.68 60.02 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 
Minimum 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Std. Dev. 31.41 33.55 35.73 35.03 32.69 
 
Variable definitions: N_FIRMS = number of industrial firms in which bank holds equity investments over the period 2004-2008; FIRM_EQ = mean of bank equity 
investments as percentage of individual industrial firms’ total equity; PROP_CONTR = proportion of industrial firms in which bank is the majority shareholder 
(more than 50% of equity); FIRM_EQ_CONTR = mean of equity investments as percentage of industrial firms’ total equity where the bank is the majority 
shareholder; EXPOS1 =  ratio of total equity investments (in financial and non-financial firms) to total assets; EXPOS2 = ratio of total equity investments (in 
financial and non-financial firms) to bank equity; PROP_HT1 = proportion of industrial firms in which bank holds equity investment for 1 year, and analogously, 
PROP_HT2-HT5 for holding time of 2 to 5 years; FIRM_EQ_HT1 = mean of equity investments as percentage of industrial firms’ total equity where the bank 
holds equity investment for 1 year, and analogously, FIRM_EQ_HT2-HT5 for 2 to 5 years.   
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of risk measures by level of bank equity involvement in 
industrial firms, over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
       All Commercial  banks (444 banks) 
Mean 0.44 5.37 3.55 3.53 
Std.  0.51 5.36 1.21 1.19 
Equity investments vs no equity investments 
     with  equity investments (353 banks) 
Mean 0.46 5.77 3.38 3.36 
Std.  0.02 0.28 0.05 0.05 
     without equity investments (91 banks) 
Mean 0.40 3.80 4.21 4.19 
Std.  0.06 0.54 0.15 0.15 
T-stat of  mean test 0.93 3.16*** -6.05*** -6.22*** 
High vs low level of equity involvement for banks with equity investments 
     with above average level of equity investments (175 banks) 
Mean 0.50 6.62 3.22 3.20 
Std.  0.03 5.87 0.07 0.07 
     with below average level of equity investments (178 banks) 
Mean 0.42 4.94 3.54 3.51 
Std.  0.03 0.34 0.07 0.07 
T-stat of  mean test 1.51 2.99*** -2.90*** -2.89*** 
T-statistics for null hypothesis of identical means; ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively, for a bilateral test. 
Variable definitions: SD_ROA = standard deviation of ROA; SD_ROE = standard deviation of ROE; 
LOG_Z = log((100+ ROE)/SD_ROE); LOG_ZP = log((ROA + EQ_TA)/SD_ROA), with EQ_TA = average 
equity to total assets ratio (in %), ROA = average return on assets (in %) and ROE = average return on 
equity (in %). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5. Equity involvement in industrial firms and commercial bank risk (Equation 1), 
cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
FIRM_EQ 0.00848*** 0.0927*** -0.0418*** -0.0452*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) 
EXPOS1 0.00108 0.0150 -0.00554 0.00646 
 (0.857) (0.815) (0.814) (0.807) 
NL_TA -0.0314** -0.196 0.00958 0.0254 
 (0.047) (0.360) (0.862) (0.650) 
NONINT 0.000300 0.0283* -0.00994*** -0.00911*** 
 (0.820) (0.058) (0.003) (0.009) 
EQ_TA 0.0163** -0.0818** 0.00678 0.00901 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.556) (0.450) 
LOG_TA -0.0604*** -0.135 0.0790 0.0908* 
 (0.000) (0.541) (0.141) (0.099) 
GR_TA 0.00305 0.0121 -0.00898 -0.00915* 
 (0.240) (0.660) (0.104) (0.097) 
ROA 0.115** - - - 
 (0.016) - - - 
ROE - 0.000699 - - 
 - (0.988) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0273* -0.381** 0.246*** 0.234*** 
 (0.100) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT_REST 0.0188 -0.173 -0.0316 -0.0592 
 (0.347) (0.434) (0.551) (0.288) 
Constant 0.329 6.612*** 3.463*** 3.695*** 
 (0.199) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) 
Final estimation method IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity:  FIRM_EQ 0.023 0.061 0.000 0.000 
                            EXPOS1 0.733 0.152 0.643 0.665 
    Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
    Overidentifying restrictions 0.486 0.125 0.117 0.163 
Observations 444 444 444 444 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Dependent variable definitions: SD_ROA = standard deviation of ROA; SD_ROE = standard deviation of ROE; 
LOG_Z = log((100+ ROE)/SD_ROE); LOG_ZP = log((ROA + EQ_TA)/SD_ROA), with EQ_TA = average equity to 
total assets ratio (in %), ROA = average return on assets (in %) and ROE = average return on equity (in %). 
Independent variable definitions (on average over the period, except the regulatory indices): FIRM_EQ = mean of 
equity investments as percentage of individual industrial firms’ total equity; EXPOS1 = ratio of total equity 
investments (in financial and non-financial firms) to total assets; NL_TA = net loans/total assets; NONINT = net non 
interest income/net operating income; EQ_TA = equity/total assets; LOG_TA = log of total assets; GR_TA = annual 
growth rate of total assets; SUP_REG = index for strength of supervisory regime; ACT_REST = index for bank 
activity restrictions. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity); underidentification tested using the Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic (H0: irrelevant instruments); overidentifying restrictions tested using Hansen test (H0: valid 
instruments). 
 Table 6. Equity involvement in industrial firms and commercial bank risk (Equation 2), 
cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
PROP_CONTR 0.00245*** 0.0395*** -0.0275*** -0.0327*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.009) (0.002) 
PROP_LHT -0.00122** -0.0117* -0.0187* -0.0144 
 (0.045) (0.082) (0.053) (0.132) 
EXPOS1 0.00387 0.0697 -0.0144 0.00868 
 (0.657) (0.392) (0.639) (0.765) 
NL_TA -0.0101 0.0107 0.0940 0.105 
 (0.649) (0.960) (0.171) (0.127) 
NONINT 0.000924 0.0382** -0.0117*** -0.0103*** 
 (0.524) (0.020) (0.003) (0.008) 
EQ_TA 0.0245*** -0.0981** 0.0239 0.0221 
 (0.008) (0.047) (0.172) (0.216) 
LOG_TA -0.0157 0.101 -0.0258 -0.0160 
 (0.314) (0.568) (0.579) (0.731) 
GR_TA 0.00368 0.0143 -0.0122* -0.0122* 
 (0.320) (0.663) (0.074) (0.078) 
ROA 0.128** - - - 
 (0.011) - - - 
ROE - 0.0185 - - 
 - (0.741) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0293 -0.365** 0.206*** 0.207*** 
 (0.158) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT_REST -0.0256 -0.446** -0.0270 -0.0527 
 (0.161) (0.010) (0.652) (0.386) 
Constant 0.509* 8.704*** 4.720*** 4.759*** 
 (0.072) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Final estimation method OLS OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity : PROP_CONTR 0.108 0.0708 0.001 0.000 
                            PROP_LHT 0.120 0.116 0.002 0.010 
                            EXPOS1 0.789 0.870 0.881 0.691 
    Underidentification - - 0.000 0.000 
    Overidentifying restrictions - - 0.723 0.680 
Observations 389 389 389 389 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***.  
Variable definitions: as defined in Table 5 and PROP_CONTR = proportion of firms a bank holds equity investment 
in where it is the majority shareholder; PROP_LHT = proportion of firms a bank holds equity positions in for a 
duration of either 3, 4 or 5 years. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity); underidentification tested using the Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic (H0: irrelevant instruments); overidentifying restrictions tested using Hansen test (H0: valid 
instruments). 
 
 Table 7. Equity involvement in industrial firms, shareholder protection and commercial 
bank risk (Equation 3), cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
FIRM_EQ 0.00640** 0.105*** -0.0440*** -0.0423*** 
 (0.027) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
FIRM_EQ× SH_PROCT -0.0000593 -0.00662 -0.00160 -0.00263 
 (0.941) (0.518) (0.546) (0.317) 
EXPOS1 0.00415 0.0120 0.00962 -0.00153 
 (0.475) (0.853) (0.714) (0.949) 
NL_TA -0.0190 -0.173 0.0285 0.0159 
 (0.286) (0.433) (0.622) (0.786) 
NONINT 0.000551 0.0272* -0.00896** -0.00912** 
 (0.675) (0.071) (0.011) (0.011) 
EQ_TA 0.0177*** -0.0806** 0.00724 0.00386 
 (0.010) (0.025) (0.553) (0.751) 
LOG_TA -0.0399** -0.168 0.0846 0.0892 
 (0.019) (0.438) (0.128) (0.115) 
GR_TA 0.00289 0.0138 -0.00861 -0.00810 
 (0.313) (0.620) (0.118) (0.147) 
ROA 0.123** - - - 
 (0.011) - - - 
ROE - -0.00707 - - 
 - (0.878) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0342** -0.338** 0.239*** 0.249*** 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT_REST -0.00627 -0.190 -0.0618 -0.0604 
 (0.761) (0.399) (0.300) (0.318) 
Constant 0.470* 6.693*** 3.751*** 3.707*** 
 (0.054) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Final estimation method IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity: FIRM_EQ 0.087 0.033 0.000 0.000 
                          EXPOS1 0.422 0.864 0.281 0.414 
    Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    Overidentifying restrictions 0.665 0.457 0.183 0.346 
Observations 444 444 444 444 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***.  
Variable definitions as defined in Table 5 and SH_PROCT = revised anti-director rights index (Djankov et al. 2008), 
scaled to have a minimum of zero. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity); underidentification tested using the Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic (H0: irrelevant instruments); overidentifying restrictions tested using Hansen test (H0: valid 
instruments). 
 Table 8. Equity involvement in industrial firms, shareholder protection and commercial 
bank risk (Equation 4), cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
PROP_CONTR 0.00621*** 0.0894*** -0.0245** -0.0329*** 
 (0.009) (0.003) (0.043) (0.007) 
PROP_CONTR× SH_PROCT -0.00215 -0.0299 0.00838 0.0131** 
 (0.127) (0.111) (0.192) (0.044) 
PROP_LHT -0.0108** -0.135** 0.0326*** 0.0381*** 
 (0.036) (0.031) (0.002) (0.000) 
PROP_LHT× SH_PROCT 0.00512* 0.0663** -0.0180*** -0.0214*** 
 (0.055) (0.047) (0.003) (0.001) 
EXPOS1 0.00457 0.0563 -0.0312 -0.0159 
 (0.620) (0.539) (0.211) (0.522) 
NL_TA 0.00203 0.0306 0.0290 0.0401 
 (0.920) (0.894) (0.602) (0.478) 
NONINT 0.00102 0.0382** -0.0112*** -0.0104*** 
 (0.508) (0.031) (0.002) (0.004) 
EQ_TA 0.0261*** -0.0901* 0.00853 0.00776 
 (0.004) (0.084) (0.514) (0.560) 
LOG_TA -0.0192 -0.00889 -0.0209 -0.0253 
 (0.180) (0.964) (0.585) (0.508) 
GR_TA 0.000831 -0.00601 -0.00586 -0.00564 
 (0.803) (0.859) (0.330) (0.365) 
ROA 0.128*** - - - 
 (0.007) - - - 
ROE - 0.00173 - - 
 - (0.975) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0472** -0.496** 0.248*** 0.251*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT_REST 0.00420 0.0393 -0.0550 -0.0742 
 (0.859) (0.896) (0.300) (0.167) 
Constant 0.488* 7.636*** 3.247*** 3.383*** 
 (0.073) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Marginal effects:     
PROP_CONTR at Med(SH_PROCT) - - - -0.0132*** 
PROP_CONTR at Max(SH_PROCT) - - - 0.00654 
PROP_LHT at Med(SH_PROCT) -0.00311** -0.0357** 0.00554** 0.00593** 
PROP_LHT at Max(SH_PROCT) 0.00456 0.0637 -0.0215** -0.0262** 
Final estimation method IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity :  PROP_CONTR 0.785 0.873 0.272 0.681 
                            PROP_LHT 0.053 0.030 0.000 0.000 
                            EXPOS1 0.336 0.661 0.102 0.174 
    Underidentification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    Overidentifying restrictions 0.599 0.897 0.283 0.501 
Observations 389 389 389 389 
 P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. Variable definitions as 
defined in Table 6. IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity); underidentification tested using the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (H0: irrelevant instruments); overidentifying restrictions tested using Hansen test 
(H0: valid instruments). Significance of marginal effects determined using Wald tests.  
 
 
 Table 9. Equity involvement in industrial firms and risk for commercial banks engaged in 
such equity investment (Equation 1), cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
FIRM_EQ 0.00135 0.0242** -0.00513** -0.00530*** 
 (0.115) (0.023) (0.014) (0.006) 
EXPOS1 0.0109 0.0778 -0.0369** -0.0232* 
 (0.181) (0.299) (0.027) (0.097) 
NL_TA -0.00312 -0.0703 0.0251 0.0427 
 (0.868) (0.786) (0.590) (0.328) 
NONINT 0.000827 0.0358** -0.00955*** -0.00936*** 
 (0.616) (0.045) (0.002) (0.001) 
EQ_TA 0.0164* -0.0920** 0.0143* 0.0151** 
 (0.057) (0.019) (0.063) (0.041) 
LOG_TA -0.0229 0.105 -0.0207 -0.0275 
 (0.131) (0.576) (0.526) (0.367) 
GR_TA 0.00258 0.0139 -0.00653 -0.00645 
 (0.325) (0.635) (0.172) (0.155) 
ROA 0.151*** - - - 
 (0.003) - - - 
ROE - 0.00253 - - 
 - (0.965) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0390** -0.334* 0.133*** 0.142*** 
 (0.028) (0.098) (0.007) (0.003) 
ACT_REST -0.0409*** -0.549*** 0.0801** 0.0724** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.018) (0.029) 
Constant 0.808*** 9.678*** 2.698*** 2.709*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Final estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity: FIRM_EQ 0.240 0.382 0.411 0.122 
                           EXPOS1 0.248 0.815 0.667 0.613 
Observations 353 353 353 353 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: as defined in Table 5. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity). 
 Table 10. Equity involvement in industrial firms and risk for commercial banks engaged in 
such equity investment (Equation 2), cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
PROP_CONTR 0.00198** 0.0354*** -0.00757*** -0.00752*** 
 (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PROP_LHT -0.00201*** -0.0179** 0.00426** 0.00426** 
 (0.006) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) 
EXPOS1 0.00123 0.0590 -0.0284 -0.0155 
 (0.894) (0.475) (0.117) (0.328) 
NL_TA 0.00576 0.150 -0.00168 0.0166 
 (0.750) (0.460) (0.970) (0.690) 
NONINT 0.000874 0.0374** -0.00951*** -0.00929*** 
 (0.584) (0.038) (0.002) (0.002) 
EQ_TA 0.0279*** -0.0853* 0.0137 0.0136 
 (0.005) (0.093) (0.232) (0.226) 
LOG_TA -0.0131 0.0866 -0.0120 -0.0187 
 (0.351) (0.649) (0.726) (0.559) 
GR_TA 0.00171 0.00449 -0.00561 -0.00528 
 (0.498) (0.878) (0.234) (0.242) 
ROA 0.141*** - - - 
 (0.003) - - - 
ROE - 0.0202 - - 
 - (0.724) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0362** -0.336* 0.125** 0.133*** 
 (0.038) (0.087) (0.010) (0.004) 
ACT_REST -0.0433*** -0.565*** 0.0773** 0.0703** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.021) (0.030) 
Constant 0.744*** 10.28*** 2.565*** 2.566*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Final estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity :  PROP_CONTR 0.170 0.316 0.762 0.266 
                            PROP_LHT 0.196 0.152 0.0786 0.512 
                            EXPOS1 0.247 0.632 0.630 0.489 
Observations 353 353 353 353 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: as defined in Table 6. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity). 
 Table 11. Equity involvement in industrial firms, non-linearities and risk for commercial 
banks, cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
FIRM_EQ 0.00318*** 0.0380*** -0.0296*** -0.0321*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
FIRM_EQ_CSQ -0.0000620* -0.000336 -0.000214 -0.000209 
 (0.059) (0.324) (0.628) (0.653) 
EXPOS1 0.00549 0.0586 -0.0162 -0.00696 
 (0.265) (0.214) (0.402) (0.747) 
NL_TA -0.0189 -0.163 0.0151 0.0318 
 (0.335) (0.456) (0.767) (0.529) 
NONINT 0.00112 0.0360** -0.0110*** -0.0102*** 
 (0.405) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) 
EQ_TA 0.0164** -0.0873*** 0.0115 0.0139 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.324) (0.230) 
LOG_TA -0.0323** 0.0759 0.0271 0.0368 
 (0.030) (0.655) (0.663) (0.567) 
GR_TA 0.00338 0.0207 -0.0101* -0.00959* 
 (0.298) (0.463) (0.054) (0.059) 
ROA 0.125*** - - - 
 (0.009) - - - 
ROE - -0.00397 - - 
 - (0.940) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0232 -0.312** 0.246*** 0.231*** 
 (0.192) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT_REST -0.0174 -0.371** -0.000895 -0.0288 
 (0.297) (0.021) (0.986) (0.585) 
Constant 0.571** 7.898*** 3.430*** 3.673*** 
 (0.018) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Final estimation method OLS OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity: FIRM_EQ 0.267 0.095 0.002 0.000 
                           EXPOS1 0.963 0.780 0.477 0.445 
    Underidentification - - 0.070 0.070 
    Overidentifying restrictions - - 0.142 0.268 
Observations 444 444 444 444 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: as defined in Table 5 and FIRM_EQ_CSQ = demeaned square of FIRM_EQ. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity); underidentification tested using the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic (H0: irrelevant instruments); overidentifying restrictions tested using Hansen test (H0: valid instruments).  
 Table 12. Equity involvement in industrial firms and risk for large commercial banks 
(Equation 1), cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
FIRM_EQ 0.00736** 0.114** -0.0333*** -0.0342*** 
 (0.043) (0.028) (0.003) (0.002) 
EXPOS1 0.00177 0.0666 -0.0125 0.0180 
 (0.896) (0.670) (0.713) (0.576) 
NL_TA 0.00924 0.347 -0.0555 -0.0191 
 (0.602) (0.191) (0.398) (0.764) 
NONINT 0.00262** 0.0491*** -0.0101*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
EQ_TA 0.0303** -0.0367 0.00959 0.0142 
 (0.031) (0.706) (0.745) (0.624) 
LOG_TA -0.000617 0.306 -0.0235 -0.0410 
 (0.969) (0.243) (0.659) (0.408) 
GR_TA -0.00180 -0.0222 -0.00245 -0.00231 
 (0.344) (0.372) (0.651) (0.659) 
ROA 0.0725 - - - 
 (0.324) - - - 
ROE - 0.0599 - - 
 - (0.257) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0548** -0.817*** 0.213*** 0.204*** 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) 
ACT_REST -0.0258 -0.431* 0.0193 -0.00408 
 (0.165) (0.084) (0.745) (0.945) 
Constant 0.315 5.301 3.766*** 4.121*** 
 (0.340) (0.208) (0.000) (0.000) 
Final estimation method IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity: FIRM_EQ 0.065 0.063 0.000 0.000 
                           EXPOS1 0.759 0.565 0.751 0.938 
    Underidentification 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 
    Overidentifying restrictions 0.795 0.431 0.908 0.937 
Observations 256 256 256 256 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: as defined in Table 5. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity); underidentification tested using the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic (H0: irrelevant instruments); overidentifying restrictions tested using Hansen test (H0: valid instruments).  
 Table 13. Equity involvement in industrial firms and risk for small commercial banks 
(Equation 1), cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
FIRM_EQ 0.00200 0.0386** -0.0471*** -0.0479*** 
 (0.134) (0.016) (0.001) (0.001) 
EXPOS1 0.000803 0.00269 0.000789 0.00183 
 (0.849) (0.956) (0.977) (0.950) 
NL_TA -0.0387 -0.503 0.0385 0.0248 
 (0.279) (0.157) (0.647) (0.777) 
NONINT 0.000219 0.0256 -0.00828 -0.00831 
 (0.927) (0.213) (0.144) (0.135) 
EQ_TA 0.00923 -0.119*** 0.00686 0.00989 
 (0.184) (0.004) (0.585) (0.449) 
LOG_TA -0.156** -0.255 0.163 0.202 
 (0.020) (0.647) (0.330) (0.233) 
GR_TA 0.00789 0.0484 -0.0124 -0.0138 
 (0.160) (0.279) (0.160) (0.109) 
ROA 0.137** - - - 
 (0.016) - - - 
ROE - -0.0424 - - 
 - (0.584) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0295 -0.285 0.275*** 0.281*** 
 (0.200) (0.106) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT_REST 0.0454 0.272 -0.163* -0.167* 
 (0.184) (0.451) (0.083) (0.082) 
Constant 0.870* 5.383 3.830*** 3.570*** 
 (0.055) (0.280) (0.002) (0.004) 
Final estimation method OLS OLS IV-GMM IV-GMM 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity: FIRM_EQ 0.324 0.268 0.002 0.001 
                           EXPOS1 0.582 0.211 0.413 0.446 
    Underidentification - - 0.034 0.034 
    Overidentifying restrictions - - 0.876 0.793 
Observations 188 188 188 188 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: as defined in Table 5. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity); underidentification tested using the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic (H0: irrelevant instruments); overidentifying restrictions tested using Hansen test (H0: valid instruments).  
 Table 14. Equity involvement in industrial firms and risk for large commercial banks 
(Equation 2), cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
PROP_CONTR 0.0132*** 0.195*** -0.0374*** -0.0397*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PROP_LHT -0.00310*** -0.0553*** 0.0107*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
EXPOS1 -0.000716 -0.0261 -0.00676 0.0230 
 (0.952) (0.859) (0.831) (0.495) 
NL_TA 0.0419** 0.818*** -0.109 -0.0809 
 (0.037) (0.007) (0.117) (0.255) 
NONINT 0.00170 0.0405** -0.00872** -0.00920** 
 (0.127) (0.037) (0.027) (0.026) 
EQ_TA 0.0126 -0.113 0.0335 0.0357 
 (0.321) (0.239) (0.229) (0.235) 
LOG_TA 0.00659 0.394 -0.0521 -0.0669 
 (0.660) (0.136) (0.310) (0.197) 
GR_TA -0.00435* -0.0684** 0.00760 0.00695 
 (0.052) (0.019) (0.207) (0.304) 
ROA 0.215*** - - - 
 (0.002) - - - 
ROE - 0.0864 - - 
 - (0.108) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0786*** -1.096*** 0.195*** 0.198*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.009) 
ACT_REST 0.00378 -0.123 -0.0225 -0.0431 
 (0.833) (0.654) (0.722) (0.531) 
Constant 0.133 4.119 3.828*** 4.127*** 
 (0.685) (0.381) (0.000) (0.000) 
Final estimation method IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity :  PROP_CONTR 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 
                            PROP_LHT 0.989 0.656 0.209 0.382 
                            EXPOS1 0.543 0.813 0.746 0.860 
    Underidentification 0.0167 0.0176 0.0197 0.0197 
    Overidentifying restrictions 0.189 0.152 0.243 0.428 
Observations 234 234 234 234 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: as defined in Table 6. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity); underidentification tested using the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic (H0: irrelevant instruments); overidentifying restrictions tested using Hansen test (H0: valid instruments).  
 Table 15. Equity involvement in industrial firms and risk for small commercial banks 
(Equation 2), cross-sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
PROP_CONTR 0.00276* 0.0454*** -0.0103*** -0.0103*** 
 (0.059) (0.010) (0.002) (0.001) 
PROP_LHT -0.000732 0.00111 -0.00320 -0.00333 
 (0.460) (0.909) (0.163) (0.143) 
EXPOS1 -0.00519 -0.0601 -0.0134 -0.0141 
 (0.649) (0.496) (0.604) (0.591) 
NL_TA -0.0391 -0.378 0.0905 0.0707 
 (0.394) (0.285) (0.255) (0.388) 
NONINT -0.000288 0.0303 -0.0143*** -0.0136*** 
 (0.913) (0.209) (0.007) (0.006) 
EQ_TA 0.0188 -0.161** 0.0190 0.0188 
 (0.121) (0.026) (0.344) (0.338) 
LOG_TA -0.146** -0.709 0.0597 0.0872 
 (0.030) (0.277) (0.721) (0.595) 
GR_TA 0.00909 0.0568 -0.0194** -0.0213** 
 (0.148) (0.289) (0.030) (0.015) 
ROA 0.131** - - - 
 (0.029) - - - 
ROE - -0.0205 - - 
 - (0.786) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0286 -0.284 0.293*** 0.307*** 
 (0.325) (0.204) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT_REST 0.0359 0.184 -0.0937 -0.0896 
 (0.338) (0.609) (0.231) (0.264) 
Constant 0.809 8.541 3.296*** 2.979*** 
 (0.127) (0.129) (0.005) (0.009) 
Final estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity :  PROP_CONTR 0.254 0.962 0.125 0.057 
                            PROP_LHT 0.811 0.316 0.213 0.234 
                            EXPOS1 0.279 0.144 0.174 0.116 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: as defined in Table 6. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity). 
  
 
Appendix 
Table A1. Correlation matrix 
  
 NL_TA NONINT EQ_TA LOG_TA GR_TA EXPOS1 FIRM_EQ PROP_LHT PROP_CONTR 
NL_TA 1.0000         
NONINT -0.5256 1.0000        
EQ_TA -0.1279 0.2182 1.0000       
LOG_TA -0.0154 -0.1151 -0.4899 1.0000      
GR_TA -0.0578 0.0910 -0.0787 0.1923 1.0000     
EXPOS1 -0.1350 0.0982 0.2246 0.1958 0.0661 1.0000    
FIRM_EQ -0.1065 0.1068 -0.0575 0.1904 0.0752 0.2000 1.0000   
PROP_LHT 0.1000 -0.0810 0.0964 -0.1238 -0.0985 -0.0706 0.3082 1.0000  
PROP_CONTR -0.1064 0.1017 -0.0241 0.1293 0.0681 0.2058 0.9655 0.2782 1.0000 
NL_TA = net loans/total assets; NONINT = net non interest income/net operating income; EQ_TA = equity/total assets; LOG_TA = log of total assets; GR_TA = annual growth 
rate of total assets; EXPOS1 = ratio of total equity investments (in financial and non-financial firms) to total assets; FIRM_EQ = mean of equity investments as percentage of 
individual industrial firms’ total equity; PROP_LHT = proportion of firms a bank holds equity positions in for a duration of either 3, 4 or 5 years; PROP_CONTR = proportion 
of firms a bank holds equity investment in where it is the majority shareholder.  
 
 
Table A2. Levels of shareholder protection index  
Country Shareholder protection index 
Austria 2,5 
Belgium 3 
Denmark 4 
Finland 3,5 
France 3,5 
Germany 3,5 
Greece 2 
Ireland 5 
Italy 2 
Luxembourg 2 
Netherlands 2,5 
Norway 3,5 
Portugal 2,5 
Spain 5 
Sweden 3,5 
Switzerland 3 
U.K. 5 
Shareholder protection index = revised anti-director rights index  
(Djankov et al. 2008) 
Table A3. Overall exposure to equity investment activities and risk for commercial banks, cross-
sectional over the period 2004-2008 
 Activity risk  Insolvency risk 
 SD_ROA SD_ROE LOG_Z LOG_ZP 
EXPOS1 0.120** 1.923*** -0.540*** -0.489*** 
 (0.023) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) 
NL_TA 0.0112 0.312 -0.0948 -0.0743 
 (0.707) (0.410) (0.260) (0.360) 
NONINT 0.00230 0.0459* -0.0164*** -0.0165*** 
 (0.244) (0.068) (0.004) (0.003) 
EQ_TA 0.00195 -0.319** 0.0700** 0.0693** 
 (0.830) (0.018) (0.041) (0.035) 
LOG_TA -0.0660** -0.585 0.146 0.122 
 (0.032) (0.200) (0.194) (0.263) 
GR_TA 0.00365 0.0189 -0.0110 -0.0115 
 (0.304) (0.594) (0.126) (0.103) 
ROA 0.121** - - - 
 (0.032) - - - 
ROE - 0.0472 - - 
 - (0.487) - - 
SUP_REG -0.0209 -0.317 0.212*** 0.203*** 
 (0.273) (0.116) (0.000) (0.000) 
ACT_REST -0.0253 -0.565*** 0.129*** 0.112** 
 (0.144) (0.006) (0.007) (0.017) 
Constant 0.824** 13.73*** 1.087 1.396 
 (0.018) (0.004) (0.359) (0.221) 
Final estimation method IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM IV-GMM 
IV tests (P-values):     
    Endogeneity: EXPOS1 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    Underidentification 0.023 0.013 0.016 0.016 
    Overidentifying restrictions 0.908 0.626 0.704 0.851 
Observations     
P-values of coefficient estimates in parentheses, with p < 0.1 *, p < 0.05 **, p < 0.01 ***. 
Variable definitions: as defined in Table 5. 
IV tests: endogeneity tested with C test (H0: exogeneity); underidentification tested using the Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic (H0: irrelevant instruments); overidentifying restrictions tested using Hansen test (H0: valid 
instruments).  
 
